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Abstract 
The paper considers why the structure of Cicero’s De Finibus implicitly favours the 
Academy, even though Cicero avoids a decision between the Stoic theory and Antiochus’ 
theory. Cicero’s educational aims require him to illustrate not only a range of theories but a 
range of criteria by which theories and the exposition of theories should be judged. By one 
criterion – style of exposition – the entire Academic tradition, not Antiochus specifically, is 
endorsed.     
 
 
 
 
Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum stages debates between exponents and critics of 
three ethical theories, with the part of critic taken by Cicero himself in each of the three 
debates. The first theory is Epicurean, the second Stoic; the third is harder to label, as it is 
attributed by Cicero not to a single philosopher or school but to a trio: Antiochus, Peripatetics 
and the so-called ‘Old Academy’ (v 8; cf. ii 34 and v 21). Like others I shall refer to it as the 
‘Antiochian’ theory, but it is important to keep in mind Cicero’s claim (which evidently 
derives from Antiochus himself, v 14) that the theory’s provenance is pre-Antiochian too.  
In the survey of his philosophical writing in De Divinatione Cicero says that his aim 
in writing De Finibus was to make known the arguments for and against each of the 
philosophers’ theories (ii 2). There is no suggestion that he intended to adjudicate on the 
debate between the schools and to promote one school’s theory at the expense of the others’ 
theories.1  In De Finibus itself Cicero promises not neutrality so much as comprehensiveness: 
‘for my part, I consider that this work gives a more or less comprehensive discussion of the 
question of the highest goods and evils. In it I have investigated not only the views with 
which I agree, but those of each of the philosophical schools individually’ (i 12).2 Cicero has 
just mentioned jurists who took one side or the other in a debate about Roman law, and he 
may wish to show that as an educator in the sphere of philosophy (cf. i 10) he has done his 
Roman readership a greater service than he would have done if, like one of those jurists, he 
had restricted his discussion to a single option and the arguments in its favour. In such a 
context ‘the views with which I agree’, quid nobis probaretur, need not amount to a promise 
that a particular theory will be shown to have Cicero’s approval; Cicero may intend merely to 
put his readers in mind of a more partial way of writing that he has, for sound educational 
                                                          
* My thanks to all those who commented on versions of this paper, including colleagues at 
the 2012 Celtic Conference in Classics (above all Sandrine Dubel and Sophie Gotteland), 
Gretchen Reydams-Schils, Malcolm Schofield and Raphael Woolf.  I have learned a lot from 
discussing the dialogue with Classics and Philosophy students at St Andrews.  
1 Notice however that in the previous sentence (De Divinatione ii 1) he says that his dialogue 
Academica reveals which kind of philosophy he finds ‘least arrogant and most consistent and 
elegant’. Compare De Natura Deorum i 11, De Officiis ii 8, Tusculan Disputations ii 4. See 
also n.3. 
2 Here and elsewhere I have used Woolf’s translation in Annas and Woolf  2001.  
reasons, avoided. On the other hand, the verb probare reminds us that when Cicero grants his 
approval, he does so as a member of the sceptical Academy.3 
After the debate with Epicureans Cicero’s own verdict (iii 1–2) is that pleasure is no 
longer a serious contender for the summum bonum; pleasure herself, if she could speak, 
would concede as much, even though her Epicurean advocates may not make the concession 
for her (iii 1).4  In this paper I focus on the contest between Stoicism and the Academy in 
books 3–5. The problem I address concerns the following combination: why does Cicero both 
avoid a decision between the Stoic theory and Antiochus’ theory and give the discussion a 
‘trajectory’ 5  with the Academy as its destination? Given that the work’s ending is 
inconclusive or ‘aporetic’, we would expect Piso’s account of Antiochus to receive the same 
treatment as the account of Stoicism, but this does not happen. The first step, and the aim of 
the first section, is to establish that this puzzling combination (of aporetic ending and unequal 
treatment) exists. In the third section I suggest that the explanation does not lie, as might be 
thought, in Cicero’s version of Academic scepticism. 
 
 
1  UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND INDECISION 
 
The most obvious disparity lies in the absence of a sixth book. Cicero devotes 
separate books, books 2 and 4 (and a little more: i 17–26 and iii 10–14), to the critique of 
Epicureanism and then of Stoicism, whereas book 5 contains both the exposition and the 
critique of the Antiochian theory. But the disparity goes beyond the absence of a book 6.6 
Cicero’s critique of Antiochus (v 77–86) is much shorter than his critiques in books 2 and 4 
and is followed by a riposte from Piso of almost equal length (v 86–95). It might be argued 
that there was no need to restate the Stoic position in a Book 6, given Cato’s exposition of 
Stoicism in Book 3 – but then there was certainly no need to grant Piso, uniquely, a riposte of 
this length. It looks very much as if Cicero has chosen to end with the focus very much on an 
Academic theory, or on the way in which Academics expound and discuss theories.  
This impression of an Academic destination is strengthened by the division of work 
between representatives of the schools. Book 5 opens with some justly celebrated scene-
setting: Romans occupy the empty Academy and fill it once again with debate (v 1–2).7  
Cicero and his companions think of the discussions that once took place there and then 
                                                          
3 Similarly Quis enim potest ea quae probabilia videantur ei non probare? (v 76) is intended 
not only to sound self-evidently reasonable but also to signal Cicero’s own allegiance to the 
New Academy. For discussions of Cicero’s sceptical vocabulary see Glucker 1995 and 
Thorsrud 2010, 76–7, n.21.  
4 Torquatus himself is not convinced by Cicero’s objections (ii 119). His refusal to submit 
allows Cicero to acknowledge that there is more advanced or esoteric Epicurean literature, 
composed by such authorities as Philodemus (ii 119), to which the preceding discussion may 
not have done justice – not that his account, so far as it goes, has been inaccurate (see i 13). 
Compare Gildenhard 2007, 11 n.32.  
5 Schofield (2012, 246) suggests ‘an Antiochian trajectory’; my own conclusion is that the 
trajectory takes us not specifically to Antiochus but to the Academic tradition, understood in 
such a way as to exclude neither Antiochus’ theory nor the Stoic theory. I comment on this 
conception of the Academic tradition, and on the most relevant alternatives, in section 3. 
6 Compare Schofield 2012, 246. 
7 There are excellent comments on the setting in Annas and Woolf 2001, xvii. Notice that in v 
1-4 speakers are put in mind of the Academics whom they will later represent: Plato and the 
Old Academy (Piso), Carneades (Cicero).   
between themselves carry out an intra-Academic discussion, with Piso representing the 
Academic Antiochus and Cicero representing the New Academy (v 6–7). That points to a 
further contrast, namely that whereas in the critique of Stoicism (book 4) and Epicureanism 
(book 2) Cicero does not speak as some kind of Stoic or Epicurean, the Academic tradition is 
shown to furnish both the theory (as expounded by Piso) and Cicero’s critique of that theory. 
Once book 5 has given the – or rather an – Academic account of the end, there is no need to 
step outside the Academy and get an external, non-Academic perspective, for the criticism of 
Academic theory can itself be Academic. We might even suppose that the retrogression of the 
dialogue in time (Book 5 is set 27 years before books 3–4 and 29 years before the first two 
books) is a nod to Antiochus’ view that in order to make headway his contemporaries need to 
look behind them, so to speak, and consider pre-Hellenistic and early Hellenistic thought and 
discourse in the Academy and Lyceum.8 
Cicero nonetheless avoids a decision, even a provisional or tentative decision, in 
favour of Antiochus’ theory.9 The division of the text into three separate debates (books 1–2, 
3–4 and 5) makes it impossible to have a decision by the characters that is informed by all 
the arguments put forward; Piso and the other characters of book 5 must remain oblivious to 
the debate (within the fiction of the dialogue, a debate yet to take place) with Cato in books 3 
and 4. The authorial Cicero, in contradistinction to the character Marcus, could have offered a 
closing verdict on the arguments of both Cato and Piso (as well as those of Marcus), but 
refrains from doing so. Instead the third and final debate ends with disagreement between the 
characters. Piso’s exposition of Antiochian ethics convinces two members of Cicero’s family, 
his young cousin Lucius (v 75–6) and his brother Quintus (v 96), but Cicero’s friend 
Pomponius (that is, Atticus) indicates that he still sides with the Epicureans, and Marcus 
Cicero himself says that Piso’s position is in need of further ‘strengthening’ (v 95). The last 
word on the philosophical discussion goes to Atticus, and it concerns the successful 
translation of Greek ideas into Latin, the topic with which De Finibus began (i 1–10). But 
while all can agree that Piso has made Greek philosophy a naturalized Roman (cf. iii 40), the 
debate between philosophers – now a debate between Roman philosophers – has not yet 
settled on a single option.  It is hardly surprising, then, that De Finibus has been said to end 
in ‘aporia’.10             
Parallelism in the philosophical exchange adds to the sense of indecision. The more 
prominent of Cicero’s objections (I shall now revert to ‘Cicero’ for the character as well as 
the author) to Antiochus’ theory (v 77–86) concerns the logical relationship between two 
Antiochian claims and one Ciceronian assumption.11 Antiochus claims both that (a) virtue is 
sufficient for happiness and that (b) some of the states or conditions that are independent of 
one’s moral character, such as illness and bodily pain, are genuine evils. Precisely because 
                                                          
8 These features of De Finibus have been set out well in a recent collection on Antiochus. See 
especially Tsouni 2012 and her suggestion that ‘the nostalgic mood is suggestive of a return 
to old authority’ (2012, 131).      
9  In the Academica Cicero declares himself unable to choose between Stoic and Antiochian 
theories (ii 134). In De Officiis iii 33 he still wavers between them (now associating the 
second theory with the Peripatetics) but dismisses all the alternatives. 
10 Griffin 1997, 5.  
11 Cicero asks not only (i) how the virtuous person can be happy despite the presence of evils, 
but also (ii) how the virtuous person can be happy despite the absence of goods (see for 
example v 84). Irwin focuses on (ii) (2012, 161–4) and says less about the presence of evils. 
In v 81 Cicero himself put the emphasis on (i): he says that he does not oppose Antiochus’ 
more expansive view of goodness, but objects that if ‘evils’ can befall the sage, then virtue or 
wisdom cannot be sufficient for happiness. 
these states – ‘dispreferred indifferents’ in Stoic jargon, or, as Antiochus would want to call 
them, ‘evils’ – are independent of moral character, it sometimes happens that virtuous people 
fall victim to them. But is a person happy if his life includes evils? Cicero assumes that (c) 
the presence of evils prevents one from being happy, and regards assumption (c) as so 
uncontroversial that he donates it to Antiochus as well: the inconsistency between (a), (b) and 
(c) is, he suggests, an inconsistency within the theory outlined by Piso. ‘Learned specialists’ 
(prudentes) would, he says, return the verdict that ‘the Stoic system is self-consistent, 
whereas yours is self-contradictory’ (v 85). Piso mentions in response Antiochus’ distinction 
between happiness and supreme happiness and his doctrine that virtue is sufficient merely for 
happiness (v 81; cf. v 71). Not surprisingly, Cicero questions this distinction and asks how 
one can be ‘happy but not happy enough’. It is worth emphasizing that Antiochus’ higher or 
fuller ideal – supreme happiness, involving both happiness and such non-moral desiderata as 
health and good looks – is an ideal for human beings, not gods, and it is natural to wonder 
how one can attain happiness without attaining the highest or fullest human good. Cicero 
suggests that this inconsistency (as he sees it) alone prevents him from joining Piso as an 
Antiochian (v 95). This sounds rather encouraging for Antiochus, until we attend to the 
parallel with book 4. Despite making a range of objections to Stoicism, Cicero suggests that 
only a single difficulty prevents him from joining Cato (iv 2). In his closing remark on Piso’s 
theory Cicero echoes his older self’s remark on Stoic theory.12  
The ‘single’ objection to Stoicism is one to which Cicero often returns (iii 10, iv 2, iv 
22, iv 57, iv 60, iv 72).13 It is that Zeno and his followers in the Stoa were original only in 
their vocabulary and otherwise shared the doctrines of the Peripatetics. It might be thought 
that in making this challenge – the ‘neutralizing argument’, as Schofield calls it14  – so 
frequently Cicero shows some measure of commitment to Antiochus, 15  given that the 
challenge is associated with the Antiochian Piso (iv 73) and is used by Piso in book 5 (v 74, v 
90). But Cicero associates it with Carneades too: Carneades ‘would tirelessly contend that on 
the whole issue known as “the problem of good and evil” there was no dispute between the 
Stoics and the Peripatetics other than a verbal one’ (iii 41).16 Cicero does not, then, present 
his use of the neutralizing argument as narrowly Antiochian. ‘Academic’ would be a better 
label.  
Nor does Cicero really commit himself to the neutralizing argument. At this point I 
need to outline the sequence that leads to the final objection to Antiochus.  After the 
exposition of Epicureanism in Book 1 one of Cicero’s central complaints against the 
Epicureans is that they do not regard virtue as a good in itself (i 25, ii 44-57, ii 69); we then 
hear from a school, the Stoa, where virtue is in itself a good, vice in itself an evil, but where 
                                                          
12 Notice the similar wording in his offer to Cato in book 4 (si istud obtinueris, traducas me 
ad te totum licebit iv 2) and his offer to Piso in book 5 (si tenueris, non modo meum 
Ciceronem [that is, his cousin Lucius] sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit v 95).  
13 See also Tusculan Disputations iv 6 and v 32–3. 
14 Schofield 2012. For discussion see also Patzig 1979, 311–2; Schofield 2008, 83; Bonazzi 
2009, 36; Irwin 2012, 152. 
15 Schofield 2012, 246 seems to suggest this, but then notes the challenge to Antiochus’ 
theory in book 5. 
16 For Carneades’ use of this challenge see also Tusculan Disputations v 120. Compare 
Brittain’s suggestion (2001, 262–3) that the substructure of De Finibus 4 and 5 is Carneadian, 
although ‘slightly recast by Cicero owing to his interest in Antiochus’ (262 n.15). Schofield 
explores particularly well the relationship between the neutralizing argument and Carneades’ 
division of moral theories (2012, 240), and argues that the relationship changed when 
Antiochus applied the neutralizing argument (2012, 242).  
other candidates for goodness and badness, such as bodily health and illness, are dismissed 
on inadequate grounds, at least according to Cicero’s objections in book 4: ‘how and where 
did you suddenly abandon the body and all those things that are in accordance with nature but 
not in our power?’ (iv 26). In the final stage of the sequence, book 5, Antiochus’ theory treats 
not only virtue and vice but also these further candidates as genuine goods and evils – but this 
is achieved, as Cicero objects, at the cost of consistency. Stoic claims about goodness and 
happiness have no such problem, whatever their other demerits might be; for Stoics it is not 
difficult to show how their own evaluation of the so-called ‘indifferents’ is consistent with 
their view of the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. Notice the implication here that, contrary 
to the neutralizing argument, Antiochus’ theory and the Stoic theory are in fact two distinct 
theories. If, as ‘learned specialists’ (v 85) would recognize, the Stoic theory is self-consistent 
and Antiochus’ theory is not, the Stoics cannot be offering the same theory as the one revived 
by Antiochus.17  
When Cicero suggests overlap between the Stoics and Antiochus, or Stoics and the 
Old Academy, he does not always suggest total overlap. He also makes the more subtle, and 
far more persuasive, suggestion that they share merely the same starting-point. That is, in 
their developmental accounts of the end they agree about the attitude to oneself with which 
human life begins (iv 25), and agree that one should develop in such a way as to live in 
accordance with nature (iv 14), but they disagree when describing proper, or natural, 
development and the attitudes and evaluations that the mature moral agent should have 
formed. As Cicero puts it, Zeno and Polemo set out from the same starting-point but at a later 
point Zeno ‘stopped’ – not that Zeno himself made this relationship clear (iv 26, iv 45). The 
claim that the overlap is merely partial, when spelled out thus, implies that Stoics and 
Antiochus actually disagree about questions of the highest importance – namely, the 
character of a fully developed human being, and so what is genuinely good and evil.        
Even Piso wavers between claims of partial and total overlap.18 Piso observes that the 
Stoics adopt the same starting-point as that of the ancients (v 23), but he has just made the 
more indiscriminate claim that the Stoics took over ‘everything’ from the Peripatetics and 
Academics (v 22). Near the end of his exposition he criticizes those – the Stoics – who do not 
keep in mind the principia naturae that they themselves recognize (v 72; compare iv 45), 
presumably regarding these principles as uncontroversial common property. But he then 
suggests that the Stoics have taken over the entire philosophy of the Old Academy (v 74). 
Cicero himself implies, as I have argued, that the two theories have different content (v 85), 
only for Piso then to deny it (v 88–9). So at the end of book 5 it is not agreed whether, or to 
                                                          
17 An anonymous referee points out to me that the following combination is possible: one 
person offers consistent arguments for a theory, while someone else offers inconsistent 
arguments for the very same theory. But this relies on a contrast between argument and 
theory, whereas in the Ciceronian passage (v 85) there is no such contrast. 
18 The distinction between these claims is more carefully observed in the critique of book 4. 
Cicero’s critique is divided into sections by requests for Cato’s permission to proceed (iv 2, 
iv 24, iv 44), and these sections contain different lines of attack. Cicero first aims to show 
how little the Stoics added to the achievements of their predecessors (iv 3–23), and here the 
polemic gains from asserting total overlap in content (iv 22). Then (iv 24–44) he allows that 
the Stoics did innovate – but by abandoning the body, and so abandoning the principia shared 
by the Stoics and their predecessors in ethics (iv 26). Here he needs to allow for some 
disagreement. When shifting to the second set of objections Cicero describes himself as 
approaching Stoic doctrines ‘more closely’ (iv 24), which may constitute an 
acknowledgement that the suggestion of only partial or initial overlap is more accurate. 
what extent, the Stoics and Antiochus offer different theories19 – nor has it been agreed which 
theory is stronger, if the theories do in fact differ from one another in the way Cicero 
(sometimes) suggests. This is an important reason not to interpret the structural imbalance as 
if it were intended to promote Antiochus’ theory. The debate has indeed become extremely 
focussed or localized, but not in such a way as to exclude either the distinctness or the truth 
of Stoic theory. Why, then, the movement towards the Academy – and to what does it lead, if 
not to Antiochus’ theory?   
 
 
2  CICERO AND PLATONIC DIALOGUE 
 
There are precedents in the dialogue tradition for Cicero’s combination of indecision 
and unequal treatment. Some of the Platonic dialogues that are usually called ‘aporetic’ 
contain not only aporia but progression – albeit incomplete – towards a Socratic moral 
position. Consider for example Plato’s Laches, the second part of which is an attempt to 
define courage. Once Laches has been shown that his definition of justice needs to be 
sufficiently broad to cover all the ways of acting courageously, courage is defined by him as 
‘a kind of endurance of the soul’ (192b), then as ‘wise endurance’ (192d) and finally by 
Nicias as ‘a kind of wisdom’, namely ‘the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or ventured’ 
(194c-195a). Nicias claims that he is using Socrates’ own view about courage, but this does 
not cause Socrates to lose his critical edge, for he shows Nicias that if we spell out what 
Nicias means, or if we spell out to what Nicias is committing himself, it becomes impossible 
to isolate courage as merely one part of virtue (199c-e). The Laches ends without reaching a 
successful definition of courage. The label ‘aporetic’ is therefore appropriate,20 but it does not 
tell the whole story. The Laches contains a sequence in which the discussion focuses more 
and more on the epistemic character of one virtue, courage; the dialogue thus takes us most of 
the way, though not all the way, to Socrates’ view of the virtues as forms of knowledge. The 
point of the impasse at the dialogue’s end is to impress upon Plato’s readers that if, like 
Nicias, they flirt with Socratic views of the nature of virtue, they had better be more prepared 
than Nicias was to rethink the relationship between the virtues. Revising one’s view of the 
inter-virtue relationship may be a price worth paying; seeing how large a price must be paid 
and whether it is worth paying is a matter not for the Laches but for the dialogue Protagoras. 
But Plato’s readers must recognize that Socrates’ view of virtue as knowledge cannot simply 
be annexed to whatever else they might believe about the virtues. That, I suggest, is what 
Plato is saying when he leads the discussion further and further in the direction of Socrates’ 
view and then halts that progression by making Socrates throw the discussion of his own 
view into aporia.    
It is helpful to consider some of Plato’s aporetic writing, not only because Plato’s 
dialogues were an important literary model for Cicero, but also because the contrast with 
Plato brings into view two features of Ciceronian philosophical dialogue. First, Ciceronian 
                                                          
19 But see the end of n.18. 
20 The phrase ‘aporetic dialogue’ is now very familiar, but in using it we should not suppose 
that we are referring to a subgenre that was recognized in antiquity. Notice the absence of 
ἀπορητικός from the classification of Platonic dialogues in Diogenes Laertius iii 49. Proclus 
uses ἀπορητικός to refer to part of the Parmenides (In Prm. 631 and 983), but, insofar as 
there was a debate in antiquity about Plato and the term ἀπορητικός, it concerned the 
question ‘was Plato himself ἀπορητικός?’, not ‘is this Platonic dialogue ἀπορητικός?’. See 
Sextus Empiricus Pyr. i 221–6; there is a reference to that debate, or at least to a similar 
debate, at Diogenes Laertius iii 51.   
dialogue, at least in De Finibus, lacks a ‘Socrates’ figure – or rather it lacks a figure whose 
role actually matches Socrates’ role in dialogues like the Laches. 21  Cicero himself acts 
throughout the dialogue as the critic; to that extent he resembles Socrates, and he may have 
thought of his role in the dialogue as Socratic. But in Plato Socrates is not just a critic. 
Socrates is associated with moral positions or paradoxes, such as the thesis that virtue is 
knowledge, towards which the discussion is or could be taken; Cicero is not. Cicero 
associates himself rather with second-order or epistemological claims about the level of 
commitment we should give to moral and other doctrines.22 In a first-order discussion of 
ethics Cicero cannot have the same kind of centripetal effect on the discussion that Socrates 
has in Socratic dialogues like the Laches. More generally, the fact that Cicero’s dialogues, 
unlike Plato’s Socratic dialogues, were not in origin part of a literary movement 
commemorating a single great philosopher is surely one reason for the greater open-
endedness of Ciceronian dialogue.23  
Secondly, Cicero’s dialogue asks its readers to make a wider range of choices. 
Readers of the Laches are asked by Plato to consider how far they are willing to go in the 
direction of one central philosopher’s thought. Cicero, by contrast, confronts his reader not 
only with a choice between philosophical theories but also with a choice between 
philosophical traditions – Academic (or Academic-Peripatetic), Stoic and Epicurean. So 
when we consider the outcomes of Ciceronian dialogue we need to distinguish between two 
questions: (i) within which tradition, or within which family of traditions, should we seek and 
discuss answers to questions about goodness, badness and happiness, and (ii) what are the 
answers to those questions? With regard to (ii) the dialogue excludes one option, the 
Epicureans, but does not choose between the Stoic theory and Antiochus’ theory; I shall 
argue that with regard to (i), the choice between traditions, the dialogue is committed to the 
Academy. Hence the combination of indecision and partiality.  
 
 
3  CHOOSING BETWEEN TRADITIONS  
 
 What exactly does it mean to explore ethics within the Academic tradition? As Cicero 
knew particularly well, there were several ways in which the Academic philosophical 
tradition could be given a single identity or character and contrasted with other traditions. 
Some characterizations or contrasts may require specific Academics to be excluded – and in 
some contrasts members of the Peripatetic tradition can be added on the Academic side. The 
most relevant attempts to characterize the Academic tradition can be summarized as follows: 
 
(a) Epistemology. Academics oppose the dogmatism of the Stoa and other schools.  
[Non-sceptical Academics must be excluded.] 
(b) Mode of exploration. Academics examine a thesis or doctrine by arguing both for it 
and against it.  
[Academics who argue in some other manner must be excluded.] 
(c) Ethical doctrines. Academics (and Peripatetics) share doctrines on goodness and 
happiness.  
[Non-doctrinal or heterodox Academics (and Peripatetics) must be excluded.] 
(d) Rhetoric. Academics (and Peripatetics) study rhetoric and cultivate eloquence.    
                                                          
21 Contrast Annas and Woolf 2001, xvii. I am grateful to Raphael Woolf for discussion of this 
point.   
22 See n.3 above and Schofield 2008, 81. 
23 For which see again Schofield 2008. 
 From Cicero’s perspective, which of these can most plausibly unify the entire Academic 
tradition? I begin with (a). Cicero of course knew Philo’s version of the epistemological 
characterization of the school. Philo may have gone so far as to suggest that all Academics 
held the same epistemological views, and so that no professed Academics need be excluded 
after all.24  After Antiochus had written his attack on Philo (Academica i 13, ii 11–12), 
reviving Philo’s suggestion of a single Academic epistemology would demand either a 
defence or a modification of Philo’s historical claims, and in De Finibus Cicero offers 
neither. When Lucius suggests that Antiochus and Carneades pull him in different directions 
(v 6), he is not corrected – instead he receives from Piso arguments to draw him from the 
New Academy to the Old (v 7). Cicero for his part signals his allegiance to the New 
Academy, for which he is teased by Piso, and restricts his approval to the verdict of 
plausibility (v 76).25   Cicero does not attempt to unite the entire Academic tradition in 
epistemological terms. The rift in Academic epistemology is simply taken for granted.  
 Argument pro and contra is of course built into the structure of De Finibus.26 But this 
kind of adversarial discourse is difficult to associate with the entire Academic tradition. For 
one thing it is not how Piso, Cicero’s fellow Academic, argues. Piso sees his task as to argue 
for Antiochus and to answer Cicero’s objections, not to give the case against Antiochus as 
well. A further difficulty is that the Academy provides different models of adversarial 
discourse, with different conceptions of what the argument pro should involve. Cicero 
himself makes this clear (De Finibus ii 2–3). One model, connected by Cicero with 
Arcesilaus, is for one person to provide an argument for a thesis or theory and another the 
argument against it; as author Cicero provides exactly this combination, making one 
character, such as Piso or Torquatus, defend a theory before it is attacked by the character 
Cicero. Just as Arcesilaus’ pupils ‘defended’ their view, so Torquatus gives his reasons for 
his view (ii 2–3). But a second model is to provide merely a thesis and then arguments 
against the thesis. According to Cicero, this second, inferior model is currently followed 
‘even in the Academy’. Cicero is evidently encouraging his readers to view his design of the 
dialogue as faithful to Arcesilaus, rather than ‘Academic’ in some broader sense.27      
 With (c), ethical doctrines, we come back to Antiochus. At the start of book 4 (iv 3–
19) Cicero outlines a system shared, as he suggests, by Speusippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates, 
Polemo and Theophrastus (iv 3), one claim of which is that there are goods of both body and 
mind (iv 16). The aim of this reconstruction is to show the insignificance of the Stoics’ 
contribution to philosophy – an aim that has both a Carneadian and an Antiochian origin.28 
But Carneades himself can hardly be included as a member of this doctrinal tradition, and 
Cicero’s own place in it is uncertain, for Cicero’s task at the end of book 5 is to challenge the 
                                                          
24 See Philo’s denial of two Academies (Academica i 13). Brittain provides a reconstruction 
(2001, 166–8) and full contextualization (2001, 169–219) of Philo’s ‘redefinition’ of the 
Academy. 
25 See n.3. It is now widely recognised that Cicero can retain the standpoint of a sceptical 
Academic and yet also endorse as plausible theses belonging to non-sceptical Academics or 
even to non-Academics, such as Stoic theses concerning the goodness of virtue or the 
providence of god. See e.g. Tusculan Disputations iv 7 and Long 1995, 41. 
26 Annas and Woolf 2001, x and xii.   
27 Notice also that Piso speaks contemptuously about Arcesilaus’ procedure (v 10), although 
he is more sympathetic to Aristotle’s practice of arguing on either side. For the attribution to 
Aristotle of argument on either side compare De Oratore iii 80 and Tusculan Disputations ii 
9. 
28 See the text to n.16 above. 
consistency of this venerable system. As we have seen, Cicero suggests there that Stoicism 
offers an account of the end that is more consistent than (and so of course distinct from) 
Antiochus’ account. 
This leaves (d), which concerns not the content of theories but the eloquence with 
which they are expounded. Notice now that the history of Plato’s successors at the start of 
book 4 does not only set out doctrines; it also contrasts the style of Academic and Peripatetic 
writing with that of Stoic writing, reprising criticism of Stoic style made in Cicero’s 
rhetorical works (De Oratore i 50, iii 66). Now in De Finibus 4 he contrasts the Peripatetics 
and Academics, who wrote in a suitably polished and full style, with the Stoics, latecomers 
who wrote in a pedantically ‘hair-splitting’ style (iv 3–7).29 Moral philosophy was originally 
rhetorical, but then Zeno entered the scene and introduced an impoverished style of arguing 
and writing. (This kind of story, in which an innovator is blamed for disrupting the old 
marriage between rhetoric and philosophy, obviously appealed to Cicero; compare his 
account in De Oratore iii 60–1 and 72, where Socrates is blamed for ending the marriage.) 
We can compare the history at the start of book 4 with the extraordinary challenge to Cato 
later in the book. Cicero imagines the followers of Plato returning to life and asking Cato 
why on earth he prefers the Stoics to them (iv 61). At first the Platonists’ case is based on 
Zeno’s lack of original doctrines, but then they add that studying with them would have 
enhanced Cato’s eloquence (iv 61).    
Characterizing the Academy in terms of its cultivation of rhetoric may seem 
philosophically unexciting. That rather depends on whether one regards as parts of 
philosophy the tasks of applying philosophical theory to life and persuading others to do so. 
At least from Cicero’s point of view, a strong attraction of a rhetorical characterization of the 
Academy, and of the contrast with Stoicism, is that the New Academy need not be 
excluded.30  Carneades’ eloquence has already been noted at iii 41, and Cicero the character 
has already made a point of using ‘the rhetoric of philosophers’ (ii 17) in his critique of 
Epicureanism.31 An epistemological account of Academic unity would require either some 
omissions or some Philonian ingenuity of the kind so objectionable to Antiochus.  Rhetoric, 
by contrast, can more easily unite Academics.  
More specifically, it can connect Cicero’s Academic allegiance to that of Brutus, an 
Antiochian32  and the dedicatee of De Finibus. In Brutus 119–20 Cicero contrasts Stoic 
discourse with the eloquence shared by Peripatetics and Academics, and says that this 
                                                          
29 He then describes Stoic writing on the subject of rhetoric as perfect reading for someone 
who wishes to stop speaking (iv 7).  See also iii 3 (subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi 
genus). I shall not consider what could be said in defence of Stoicism, but see Atherton 1988, 
403 and 414–5.  
30 The eloquence of Arcesilaus and Carneades is mentioned already in De Oratore (iii 67–8), 
and in De Oratore iii 80 Arcesilaus and Carneades (and Aristotle) are used to illustrate the 
intellectual qualities of the ‘complete’ orator. On the other hand, Arcesilaus’ predecessors in 
the Academy are said to have failed – ‘perhaps’ – to attain Aristotle’s high level of eloquence 
(iii 67); the Academy had to wait until Arcesilaus for the Aristotelian standard to be matched. 
There is no intention in this part of De Oratore to show the unity of the Academic tradition; 
on the contrary, it is suggested that the Academy is a unit only in name. Contrast the unitary 
picture of Academic eloquence in De Finibus iv 61. 
31  Cicero’s rhetorical critique of Epicureanism is the object of an important analysis by 
Inwood (Inwood 1990). Whereas Annas suggests that Piso ‘has won the rhetorical battle’ 
(Annas and Woolf 2001, 150 n.70; cf. 143 n.55.), I suggest that, so far as the battle concerns 
rhetoric, the palm belongs more generally to the Academics.     
32 See De Finibus v 8 and Sedley 1997.  
eloquence is a point in favour of Brutus’ choice of the Academy. Elsewhere in his overtures 
to Brutus Cicero relies on a characterization of the Academy that is partly rhetorical, partly 
doctrinal (no mention of the divisive subject of epistemology): ‘we make more use of that 
philosophy which produced fluency in speaking and in which what is said does not greatly 
disagree with popular opinion’ (Paradoxes of the Stoics 2). ‘We’, nos, must in this context 
mean ‘Brutus and I’, not ‘I’, for Cicero has just contrasted Cato with ‘you and me’.33  In this 
other work, Paradoxes of the Stoics, Cicero tries to expound Stoic doctrines in such a way as 
to gain approval for them (4), and in showing the particular challenge that this poses he 
contrasts Stoic and Academic doctrine without fussing about whether the Academy really 
was a doctrinal school. (The vagueness of ‘what is said’, dicuntur, may show awareness of 
the difficulty of treating the Academy as a doctrinal ethical tradition, a question that can 
hardly be overlooked in the more comprehensive ethical work that De Finibus purports to 
be.) But in Paradoxes of the Stoics Cicero also draws a contrast between the Stoic neglect of 
rhetorical ornament and expansiveness and the eloquence on which he and Brutus, as 
Academics, can both draw.  
A further advantage of rhetorical characterization is that Cicero can decide in favour 
of the Academy – that is, in favour of the Academic style of discourse – without deciding 
between Stoic and Antiochian theories. As Cicero says to Cato, ‘Stoic doctrines may be true, 
and they are certainly important, but they are not handled as they should be’ (iv 7). If the 
demand is that ethics – or at least the most important ethical topics, such as virtue34 – be 
treated with Academic rhetorical polish, the ethical doctrines given rhetorical treatment could 
be either Stoic or a more rigorous version of Antiochus’ compromise. From this perspective 
it is already intelligible that Cicero later presented the Tusculan Disputations as the climax of 
his ethical works. 35  One of Cicero’s own contributions in Tusculan Disputations is to 
improve on the Stoics in making Stoic doctrine persuasive: for example, the Stoics’ own way 
of showing virtue to be sufficient for happiness is not good enough for Cicero’s interlocutor 
(v 13),36 and it falls to Cicero himself to do better. Cicero even suggests that rhetorical 
fullness and ornamentation are part of good philosophy: ‘I have always judged perfected 
philosophy to be that which can speak on the greatest subjects in a full and ornate style’ 
(Tusculan Disputations i 7). The pose is retrospective, but Cicero is warming up his readers 
for the highly rhetorical treatment of ethics that lies ahead (cf. Tusculans i 112).  
                                                          
33 This is less certain when Cicero later says that he is translating Stoic doctrines into ‘our 
oratorical kind of discourse’ (ad nostrum hoc oratorium ... dicendi genus, 5). Unless in this 
claim of ownership nostrum means merely ‘my’ (which seems quite possible), there is here 
another attempt to unite the Academies of Cicero and Brutus. 
34 In iii 19 Cicero concedes that the discussion of certain topics, such as the ‘basic elements 
of nature’ (self-awareness, self-love and the desire for bodily health), does not need rhetorical 
ornamentation. (At this early point in Cato’s discussion virtue, or the perfection of human 
nature, is not yet in sight; contrast the flourish at iii 75-6.) In book 1 Cicero says to Torquatus 
that he does not demand eloquence ‘very much’ (admodum) from a philosopher who lacks it 
(i 15). This is puzzling, given the comments on Stoic style in iv 5-7. But in book 1 he wishes 
to place the emphasis on the content of Epicurean theory, which (he will argue) offers more 
than enough problems.  
35 See De Divinatione ii 2 and the imbalance in the summaries there of De Finibus and 
Tusculan Disputations. Schofield discusses the Philonian context (2002, 100–3). ‘What the 
Tusculans offer us is writing fascinated with its own performance as a paradigm of 
philosophy and of the communication of philosophy’ (Schofield 2002, 105).  
36 See Gildenhard 2007, 223–4. 
Let us see how the contrast between Stoic and Academic style is developed in books 
3–5 of De Finibus, now taking into account Cicero’s portraits of the Roman speakers.  When 
Cicero wishes to illustrate the deficiencies of Stoic discourse he does not do so by making 
Cato, the spokesman for Stoicism, a bad speaker. Instead Cicero makes Cato speak well or 
well enough – lucidly (iv 1) but without ornamentation and expansiveness (iii 26) – and lets 
his reader glimpse enough of Greek Stoic writing to suggest that it is not thanks to that Stoic 
tradition that Cato speaks well. The deficiencies in Cato’s speech arise precisely when he 
defers to the Greek Stoic tradition and uses Stoic syllogisms (iii 27); Cicero points out that 
these syllogisms are about as effective as a dagger made of lead (iv 48; cf. iv 7).37  This is 
one of several contrasts in Cicero’s writing between Cato and Stoicism. We might compare 
the point that Cicero had made about Cato in the Pro Murena,38 where he was criticising the 
harshness of Stoic moral doctrines: what we admire in Cato, Cicero says, Cato got from his 
own nature, not from his Stoic teachers (61). Elsewhere Cicero gives the credit, or some of 
the credit, to Cato’s non-Stoic teachers: in Cicero’s Brutus Cato is the most notable exception 
to the generalization that Stoics are not eloquent, and he is said to have learned his eloquence 
not from Stoics but from specialists in oratory (118–9).39   Similarly, in De Finibus the 
rhetorical high points of Cato’s speech, particularly the powerful peroration on wisdom and 
virtue (iii 75-6), are to the credit of his teachers in rhetoric (‘you borrowed that from the 
rhetoricians’, iv 7), not to the credit of Stoicism. And even Cato, when trying to persuade 
Cicero about the truth of Stoicism, falls back on entirely unpersuasive syllogisms. Cato can to 
a great extent make up for the rhetorical deficiencies of Stoicism, but even in his speech these 
deficiencies remain visible.    
As we have seen, Cicero suggests that Cato would have benefited from studying 
Plato’s successors (iv 61).40  At the start of book 5 the scene changes to the Academy, where 
Romans have been doing just that – studying Plato’s successors. Piso’s speech is addressed to 
the young Lucius (v 8), and much of it is devoted to showing Lucius the intrinsic value of 
virtue: ‘come now, Lucius, construct a mental picture of the virtues’ lofty grandeur. You will 
then be left in no doubt that those who possess the high-minded character and the uprightness 
to attain them live happy lives’ (v 71). It might seem unnecessary, after an outline of 
Stoicism in book 3, to hear arguments for the goodness and desirability of virtue all over 
again. But Cicero is going back to doctrines shared by Antiochians and Stoics in order to 
show how much more persuasive they become in Academic hands. Lucius is thoroughly won 
over (v 76). Contrast the Stoics: ‘a Stoic inspire anyone? More likely to dampen the ardour of 
the keenest student’ (iv 7). It might be argued that Lucius’ youth makes his approval less 
significant or telling. But according to a plausible interpretation Cicero uses young 
interlocutors in order to connect philosophical education to more established Roman 
educational models.41 On this interpretation, Piso’s speech to Lucius shows how Academic 
eloquence can address educational needs that are already recognized in Roman society.   
                                                          
37 At iv 7 the problem is merely one of bad style, although at iv 48 Cicero objects that nobody 
would concede to the Stoics one of the syllogism’s premises. Compare Tusculan Disputations 
ii 29 and ii 42. The leading treatments of the syllogisms are Schofield 1983 and Ierodiakonou 
2002.   
38 In De Finibus Cicero recalls but tries to distance himself from that speech (iv 74). 
39 See also Cicero’s suggestion in Paradoxes of Stoics that Cato was persuasive despite his 
Stoicism (1–2). At De Finibus iv 50 the Greek Stoics, not Cato, are blamed for the 
clumsiness of Stoic argument. 
40 Compare iv 79. 
41 ‘The mingling of ages makes the conversations a means of transmitting knowledge and 
opinions to younger generations, and thus embodies the Roman ideal of learning how to be a 
It might also be supposed that Piso’s eloquence in Book 5 is intended by Cicero to 
make a point about Piso himself, not a point about the Academy more generally. On the 
contrary, Cicero may have chosen Piso precisely in order to prevent that kind of 
interpretation. In the portrait of Cato the contrast between nature and teaching is important; 
the same contrast applies to the Epicurean Torquatus, who is said to be better than the moral 
doctrine he asserts (ii 62, ii 80), a point confirmed in hindsight by the way in which the 
historical Torquatus died (fighting against Caesar).42 One reason for emphasizing Torquatus’ 
failure to live up – or rather down43 – to Epicureanism is to reassure Cicero’s Roman readers 
that there is no risk of their being corrupted by the moral theories Cicero is inviting them to 
study: if there is conflict between an inadequate moral theory and an admirable Roman 
nature, Roman nature will assert itself appropriately. But the contrast between nature and 
teaching also helps us see why Cicero chooses Piso to act as Antiochus’ representative. Piso 
is a less substantial figure than Cato – even though he achieved, or rather received from 
Pompey, the consulship – and, unlike the other exponents, Torquatus and Cato, Piso did not 
die in the fight against Caesar’s rise to power. So why Piso? In the Brutus (236) Cicero says 
that ‘whatever Piso had, he got from his studies’.44 This allows for the strongest contrast with 
Cato – a good speaker despite his study of Stoicism – and ensures that the credit for Piso’s 
success goes to his Academic education.  Cato’s own eloquence, such as it is, reflects his 
innate qualities and his specifically rhetorical education; Piso, on the other hand, is closer to 
being a cypher where the benefits of an Academic rhetorical education can be shown without 
Piso’s own innate qualities intruding.         
Cicero’s criticisms of Stoicism in book 4 thus fare very differently in book 5. His 
objection to Stoic evaluation of non-moral ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ falters, for it is shown at the 
end of book 5 that the Stoic position at least has the merit of consistency. But the contrast 
with Academic rhetoric, as exemplified in Piso’s speech, only strengthens the objection in 
book 4 to Stoic style. It is surprising that it should be this objection, one that does not 
obviously belong to moral philosophy, that is sharpened in the final book, and I conclude by 
considering Cicero’s philosophical motivation for contrasting Stoic and Academic style.  
The demand for eloquence is made in disappointingly vague terms. Cicero comes 
closest to a technical discussion of rhetoric in ii 1–5, where he defends the form of the 
dialogue (argument on either side, not just a thesis and a response) and criticizes the lack of 
clarity in Epicurean discourse. But Cicero does not explain exactly how Piso’s speech 
manages to be persuasive. No doubt this is because the De Finibus is a work about ethics, not 
rhetoric. But then why include rhetorical style as a consideration at all? The answer lies, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
politician by shadowing one’s seniors’ (Steel 2005, 110). ‘Technical knowledge of rhetoric 
and philosophy thus acquires a rightful place within the traditional educational set-up of 
authority figures imparting their wisdom and expertise to the next generation’ (Gildenhard 
2007, 31). Compare Tsouni 2012, 149. In the Lucullus Cicero talks disparagingly about the 
discernment of rudes et indocti (Academica ii 9), but his point is specifically that the 
untrained cannot pronounce on who is wise and who is not – so the untrained had better be 
wary of trusting authorities who seem to them to be wise, as this favourable impression is 
quite unreliable.   
42 Notice mortis in ii 80. Torquatus’ Epicurean doctrine is contrasted with the behaviour of 
his ancestors (i 23–4, ii 60–1, ii 72–3), which suggests that in Torquatus’ life the influence of 
Epicureanism was countered by inherited nature.  
43 Facere melius quam dicere (ii 81). Compare the charge that Epicurus himself did not live 
in accordance with his doctrines (ii 99).  
44 For Cicero’s unflattering remarks on Piso’s consulship see Letters to Atticus i 13.2 and i 
14.6. 
suggest, in Cicero’s aim to make the dialogue, so far as possible, a comprehensive 
introduction to philosophical discourse on goodness and the end. For Cicero this requires 
more than an outline of the leading theories; it also requires an introduction to the most 
important criteria (I do not use the term in its technical, Hellenistic sense) by which both a 
theory and the exposition of a theory should be assessed. Cicero is showing his Roman 
readers how to judge philosophical discourse on the subject of the end, and this requires him 
to show how to judge persuasiveness of argument and exposition as well as doctrinal content 
narrowly understood. When judging the content of the theories, consistency is singled out for 
prominent treatment, and by this measure the Stoic theory is strong (v 79, 83, 85).  But of 
course consistency is not the only criterion. For example, Cicero also applies what we might 
call the criterion of publishability: if a moral theory is true, it should be possible to bring it 
into the public domain. ‘In my view true beliefs are those that are honourable, praiseworthy 
and noble, the sort which can be openly expressed before the Senate and the people, in every 
assembly and gathering. You should not be unashamed to think what you are ashamed to say’ 
(ii 77; cf. ii 76, iv 23, De Oratore iii 66).45   
 Persuasiveness becomes a key criterion when critical attention turns to the exposition 
of a theory. For an essential task of philosophy is to engage with opinions and change them 
(iv 52).46 The problem with Stoic discussions is that they leave their audience or readership 
unchanged. Cicero does not only complain about the deficiencies of Stoic style, but argues 
that these deficiencies cause Stoics to be unpersuasive. Not surprisingly, he takes aim at Stoic 
syllogisms: ‘even those who accept the conclusions are not converted in their hearts, and 
leave in the same state as when they came’ (iv 7). Behind the demand for persuasiveness lies 
the therapeutic or medicinal conception of philosophy that would become more prominent in 
the Tusculan Disputations,47 but its importance for the De Finibus should not be overstated. 
Insofar as we expect the philosopher to change or ‘cure’ his audience, we expect him to be 
persuasive – and a judgement in favour of the Academy becomes inescapable. But the theory 
itself must satisfy further criteria, and the major Academic theory of goodness, namely the 
theory of Antiochus, does not obviously satisfy them all, in particular the criterion of 
consistency.  
 Too sharp a distinction between persuasiveness and consistency would of course be 
implausible. (If we are attracted to a theory but then find it to be inconsistent, we shall hardly 
find it or its exponent as persuasive as we did before.) In Cicero’s dialogue Lucius is 
persuaded by Piso, but before Cicero argues that Piso’s theory is inconsistent (v 76). After 
Cicero’s objections Lucius does not offer a second verdict, and it is left open how much his 
attitude has to change. In retrospect he should see both the value of Piso’s eloquence and the 
importance of the difficulty Cicero has raised. The rhetoric cultivated in the Academy should 
be applied to the exposition of ethical theory, but it is not certain that the theory should be 
that of Antiochus. 
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45 For discussion of this requirement see Inwood 1990, 153–4.  
46 See also the objection at iv 73 (avaritiamne minuis?) and Annas and Woolf 2001, 106 n.26. 
47 See e.g. ii 45 and iii 6, and for fuller references see Douglas 1995, 214. For the Philonian 
background see Reinhardt 2000, 540; Brittain 2001, 255–95; Schofield 2002.  
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